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Inquiry Notice:  Merck & Co. v. Reynolds and the Need for 
Requiring Private Investors to Investigate Potential 
Securities Frauds 
I. Introduction 
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, it is illegal for any person “[t]o make any untrue 
statement of a material fact . . .” or “[t]o engage in any act . . . which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”1  This rule applies to 
securities traded on stock exchanges.2  Although no express cause of action 
for private securities fraud exists, courts have interpreted the securities acts 
to allow private citizens to sue for damages on the basis of an implied 
private cause of action.3  Under the applicable statute of limitations, these 
causes of action must be brought either within five years of the violation or 
within two years from “discovery of the facts constituting the violation.”4 
Unfortunately, securities frauds can be very difficult for private investors 
to discover.  First, securities frauds are inherently complex.  Plenty of 
information is available for investors who wish to learn about a particular 
security, even for newly offered stocks, but much of the information 
available is in the form of facts that are frequently difficult to interpret 
without financial education.5  Since so much information is available, 
finding a misrepresentation becomes difficult, especially for individual 
investors who may have less time available for research.  Second, a 
securities fraud cause of action requires “scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of 
mind.”6  It is difficult to prove that a company knew its sales campaign 
would fail when the company made representations concerning the product 
because if the company wants to sell stock, it will typically avoid making 
such information publically available. 
In Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split 
by clarifying the standard that lower courts should use in determining when 
a securities fraud case accrues.  Following Merck, evidence that would 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006). 
 5. See Joseph S. Hellman & Harold M. Hoffman, What to Look for in a Stock 
Prospectus, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 96, 96. 
 6. Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 341. 
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merely cause a reasonably prudent investor to begin investigating a 
potential fraud is no longer sufficient to start the statute of limitations 
running.7  Instead, investors must file within two years after a diligent 
investor reasonably should have discovered the “facts constituting the 
violation.”8  The Supreme Court’s standard does away with the often 
confusing and inconsistently-applied terminology previously used, such as 
the “inquiry notice” and “storm warnings” terms.9  Overall, the Merck 
standard has received praise from investors.10  Investors need not worry that 
the limitations period might run out before they have sufficient information 
to plead because Merck provides that facts indicating scienter must be 
discovered before a cause of action can accrue.11  This note will argue, 
however, that the Merck standard will lead to a decrease in diligent 
investigation of potential securities frauds by private investors and an 
overall increase in securities frauds.  To avoid this, the Supreme Court 
should have placed a “duty to inquire” on private plaintiffs in securities 
fraud cases, thereby charging plaintiffs with constructive knowledge of the 
fraud if the plaintiff fails to investigate once sufficient warnings of fraud 
exist. 
Part II of this note details the origin of the private securities fraud statute 
of limitations and the split that arose among circuit courts regarding when 
the cause of action accrues for securities fraud.  Part III takes a close look at 
the Merck case, including the facts and procedural history of the case as 
well as an analysis of the majority opinion.  Part IV demonstrates how the 
language of the statute does not immediately foreclose an inquiry notice 
standard, a standard which would be more practical and more consistent 
with applicable policy considerations.  Part V concludes. 
II. Law Before the Case 
Circuit courts spent many years wrestling with the proper standard for 
the statute of limitations for private securities fraud actions.  As this section 
shows, the results of this struggle were confusing and often inconsistent, 
even within the same circuit, as courts attempted to strike a balance 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1789-90 (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1798. 
 10. See, e.g., Ralph V. De Martino & Jennifer H. Unhoch, U.S. Supreme Court 
Addresses the Statute of Limitations for Private Federal Securities Fraud Claims, COZEN 
O’CONNOR (May 21, 2010), http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/sec052110.pdf. 
 11. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796. 
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between protecting investors and encouraging diligent investigation into 
potential frauds. 
A. The Supreme Court Speaks in Lampf 
In 1991, the Supreme Court provided the starting point for the analysis 
of the statute of limitations for private securities fraud actions under 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.  In Lampf, Pleva, 
Lipkind, Prupis, & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, a law firm was sued under Rule 
10b-5 for misrepresentations it made in the offering memoranda for several 
limited partnerships which “induced [the plaintiffs] to invest in the 
partnerships.”12  The district court granted summary judgment for 
defendants, holding that the case was barred by the statute of limitations; 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that summary judgment 
was not proper.13  Both courts agreed that the proper standard for the statute 
of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims was to borrow the most closely related 
state statute of limitations.14 
The Supreme Court, however, resolved a circuit split regarding the 
proper standard for accrual of the statute of limitations for private securities 
fraud under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 by holding that the statute of limitations for 
Rule 10b-5 claims should be borrowed from federal law, not state law.15  
The Court reasoned that since the Rule 10b-5 claim is an “implied [claim] 
under a [federal] statute that also contained an express [claim] with its own 
time limitation,” the same statute should be used to determine the 
limitations period for the implied claim.16  In applying this reasoning, the 
Court held that the closest analogue in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
was 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e),17 which provided the limitations period for willful 
security price manipulation, since § 78i(e) was related to the “precise 
dangers” involved in implied § 10(b) claims.18  The Court also considered 
the language of an amendment to § 13 of the 1933 Securities Act, which 
specifically provided for both actual and constructive discovery, but the 
Court chose to apply the language of § 78i(e) over that of the 1933 Act.19 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 501 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1991). 
 13. Id. at 353-54. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 358 n.4, 359. 
 16. Id. at 359. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2006). 
 18. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360-61. 
 19. See id. at 360 n.7, 364 n.9; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (“No action shall be 
maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(2) of this title unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after 
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B. The Post-Lampf Circuit Split 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf, the circuit courts 
began applying and interpreting the § 78i(e) statute of limitations vis-à-vis 
private causes of action under Rule 10b-5.  Under § 78i(e), “[n]o action 
shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation and within three years after such violation.”20  The key question 
presented by the statute, then, is when has “discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation” occurred?  From the very beginning, courts held 
that “discovery” in the securities fraud context includes not only actual 
discovery but also constructive discovery.21  In determining when such 
constructive discovery occurred, the circuits crafted two distinct standards:  
the “inquiry plus reasonable diligence” standard and a strict “duty to 
inquire” standard.  These standards have not always been clearly or 
consistently applied.22  Importantly, the term “inquiry notice” (and the 
related term “storm warnings”), which appears frequently in this context, is 
used primarily to determine when “discovery” is deemed to have occurred; 
“inquiry notice” is the standard for defining discovery, rather than a 
judicially-imposed accrual point. 
1. Inquiry Plus Reasonable Diligence—A Balance Between Preventing 
Opportunism by Investors and the Need to Meet Heightened Pleading 
Requirements 
The most plaintiff-friendly standard is the “inquiry plus reasonable 
diligence” standard.  Under this standard, courts engage in a two-part 
inquiry to determine whether sufficient “storm warnings” existed to put a 
reasonable investor on inquiry notice of the claim.23  “Storm warnings” are 
simply warning signs that an investor would recognize as indicative of 
                                                                                                                 
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993); 
see also Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 
1009 (1998). 
 22. See generally Joseph Robertson, Note, Inquiry Notice Gone Awry:  A Doctrine 
Abused in Debenedictis v. Merrill Lynch, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1491 (2009) (explaining a 
difference in the application of “inquiry notice” based on storm warnings between the 
Second and Third Circuits). 
 23. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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possible fraud.24  “Inquiry notice” refers to the point where sufficient 
“storm warnings” exist to cause a reasonable investor to investigate the 
potential fraud further.25  Courts applying the “inquiry plus reasonable 
diligence” standard have typically held that once an investor is on inquiry 
notice, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the investor, 
exercising reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts 
constituting the violation.26  Therefore, in order to obtain the benefit of the 
later accrual point, the plaintiff does not need to prove that he actually 
exercised reasonable diligence once sufficient “storm warnings” existed to 
indicate the possibility of fraud.27  If diligence would not have uncovered 
the fraud, the statutory period does not begin to run until the fraud could 
have been discovered. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck, a large majority of the 
circuit courts embraced this rule because it struck a good balance between 
various policy concerns.  Seven different circuit courts subscribed to the 
inquiry plus reasonable diligence standard,28 several of which were strongly 
influenced by the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 
Inc.29  In Sterlin, the court based its decision to adopt the inquiry plus 
reasonable diligence standard on the balance between two important 
policies:  the interest in preventing investors from sitting on their hands and 
the need to provide investors sufficient time to develop their claims.30  In 
balancing these policies, the Tenth Circuit focused on the fact that 
“particularized pleading requirements” could end up barring otherwise valid 
claims because investors would not be able to discover the facts needed for 
the pleading.31  Since delaying accrual of discovery until the fraud could 
have been discovered would still help in preventing opportunism, both 
policies could be properly served.32 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 27. Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1202 n.20 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 28. See, e.g., Betz, 519 F.3d at 876-77; Sudo Props., Inc. v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. 
Gov’t., 503 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2007); New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. 
Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003); Lepone, 305 F.3d at 10 (1st Cir. 
2002); Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1201; Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1334 (7th 
Cir. 1997); Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 29. E.g., New England Health Care, 336 F.3d at 501; Lepone, 305 F.3d at 9. 
 30. Sterlin, 154 F.3d at 1202. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Exposition of Inquiry Notice Jurisprudence 
with Regard to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Eleventh Circuit’s standard was practically identical in effect to the 
“inquiry plus reasonable diligence” standard, although the circuit used 
different phrasing and adopted its standard in order to effectuate the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA).  Prior to the SOA, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that “discovery occurs when a potential plaintiff has inquiry notice or actual 
notice of a violation.”33  Although the court still defined inquiry notice as 
the point where a reasonable investor would start investigating, the court 
held that inquiry notice does not require the plaintiff to be fully aware of the 
“nature and extent of the fraud”; instead, the possibility of fraud would be 
enough to constitute discovery sufficient to begin the running of the statute 
of limitations.34 
In the year following Theoharous, however, Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The Eleventh Circuit accordingly revisited the inquiry 
notice standard in Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and decided that, in 
light of the expansion of the limitations period for securities fraud in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “inquiry notice designates the point in time when the 
SOA statute of limitations begins to run for the purpose of reasonably 
diligent investigation to substantiate the securities fraud at issue.”35  
However, accrual would occur only when the plaintiff has sufficient facts 
enabling him to sue within the two-year statutory period.36  This standard is 
reminiscent of the “inquiry plus reasonable diligence” standard in that it 
focuses on ensuring that plaintiffs are able to sue, but the Eleventh Circuit 
did not require that plaintiffs have all the necessary facts to file suit before 
accrual occurs.37 
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning as to why plaintiffs should be protected 
drew on concerns expressed in the SOA’s legislative history rather than 
pleading requirements themselves.  Two major concerns considered by the 
Senate were the inherent complexity of securities frauds and the lack of 
deterrence of such frauds.38  The complexity of securities frauds makes it 
difficult for investors to discern whether a fraud has occurred; therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 36. Id. at 1293. 
 37. See id. at 1283. 
 38. Id. at 1285-86. 
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concealment of the fraud can be more easily accomplished.39  Since 
concealment is relatively easy, fewer private actions can be brought within 
the time limit, thus preventing investors from being able to deter securities 
frauds through private lawsuits.  The court also recognized that, according 
to the Supreme Court, the statutes guarding against securities frauds should 
be flexibly construed in order to accomplish the purposes for which the 
statutes were enacted.40  Therefore, in order to remedy the problem of the 
ease with which securities fraud can be concealed, the court held that the 
purpose of the statutory period is to allow plaintiffs time to develop and 
substantiate their claims.41 
3. The “Duty to Inquire” Approach and the Impact of a Failure to 
Investigate 
The “duty to inquire” approach is almost identical to the “inquiry plus 
reasonable diligence” standard, but it is less favorable to plaintiffs in one 
key aspect:  the consequences of a failure to investigate.  Under this 
approach, the statutory period “begins to run only after the plaintiff ‘obtains 
actual knowledge . . . or notice of the facts, which in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, would have led to actual knowledge.’”42  However, if 
the plaintiff fails to undertake an inquiry after sufficient facts existed 
indicating the possibility of fraud, the plaintiff is deemed to have had 
knowledge of the fraud as of the date the duty to inquire arose.43  The effect 
of this imputation of knowledge is to deny to the plaintiff the benefit of the 
later accrual point when reasonable diligence would have led to discovery 
of the facts.  In LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Insurance Group, Inc., 
the Second Circuit applied this standard on review of a motion to dismiss 
and held the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations 
because the plaintiff had been on inquiry notice at least a year before 
undertaking any actual investigation.44  Only the Second and Third Circuits 
adopted this standard.45 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See id. at 1286. 
 40. Id. at 1287. 
 41. Id. at 1287-88. 
 42. Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 411 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 43. Id. (quoting Dodds v. Cigna Sec., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 44. LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Grp., 318 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 154; DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (holding that once defendants showed the existence of sufficient storm warnings, 
plaintiffs must respond by showing that they did exercise reasonable diligence and did not 
discover the fraud). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
426 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:419 
 
 
The Second and Third Circuits based their decision to impute knowledge 
of the fraud due to a failure to investigate on a different, but still important, 
policy concern.  These circuits generally favored the encouragement of 
private policing by punishing investors who refuse to investigate potential 
fraud.46  In In re NAHC Securities Litigation, the Third Circuit held that 
once the defendant establishes sufficient evidence of storm warnings, the 
burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff, requiring a showing that the plaintiff 
exercised reasonable diligence and still could not discover the fraud.47  The 
court noted that, as in a previous case, “excus[ing] Appellant's lack of 
inquiry because, in retrospect, reasonable diligence would not have 
uncovered their injury . . . would, in effect, discourage investigation . . . .”48  
Essentially, this duty to inquire is meant to incentivize investors to be 
vigilant in keeping abreast of potential securities fraud claims by 
encouraging investigation once sufficient facts exist to suggest potential 
fraud. 
III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds began as a securities fraud class action brought 
by various investors who had purchased Merck’s securities between May 
21, 1999, and October 29, 2004.49  The plaintiffs alleged that Merck had 
committed securities fraud by concealing material information regarding 
the risk of heart attacks caused by one of the drugs sold and marketed by 
Merck—VIOXX.50  Because this information had been concealed, the 
prices of Merck’s securities were artificially high when the investors 
purchased them.51  Many other complaints relating to VIOXX were filed in 
different districts, prompting the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
to consolidate the various lawsuits into one action in the District of New 
Jersey.52  The complaint for the consolidated action alleged six counts, three 
of which involved violations of §§ 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange 
                                                                                                                 
 46. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1327 (3d Cir. 2002); Armstrong v. 
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 47. In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1327. 
 48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 
239 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 49. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 
(D.N.J. 2007). 
 50. Id. at 416. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.53  The plaintiffs asserted that these three alleged 
violations were filed before the statute of limitations for securities fraud had 
expired under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.54 
Defendants responded to the consolidated action by filing a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), alleging in part that the action was barred by 
the statute of limitations.55  In order to determine when the statute of 
limitations began to run against the plaintiffs, the district court applied the 
Third Circuit’s inquiry notice standard.56  Under this standard, the two-year 
provision of the statute would begin to run once the plaintiffs “in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the general 
fraudulent scheme.”57  Again, inquiry notice occurs once plaintiffs have 
“sufficient information” or “storm warnings” to indicate the probability of 
fraud; once plaintiffs are on inquiry notice, they have a duty to inquire 
further into the suspected fraud.58  If defendants have established that 
plaintiffs were on inquiry notice, the plaintiffs must then offer evidence 
proving that they had exercised due diligence but were unable to uncover 
the fraud.59 
The district court considered when the plaintiffs would have been on 
inquiry notice.  The drug involved in the case, VIOXX, was approved for 
prescription use as a painkiller by the FDA in 1999; unlike other 
painkillers, however, VIOXX was designed to avoid inhibiting a particular 
enzyme, thus reducing the risk of gastrointestinal side effects.60  A study 
conducted by Merck in March of 2000, called the “VIGOR” study, 
confirmed that VIOXX had its intended effect but also indicated that the 
patients who had taken VIOXX were more likely to suffer heart attacks 
than those who had taken the comparison medication naproxen.61  Merck 
played down the significance of these results, arguing that naproxen had 
reduced the risk for heart attacks, not that VIOXX had increased the risk.62  
Given that no data supported Merck’s hypothesis, the VIGOR study 
became the subject of extensive scientific and financial analysis throughout 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 416-17. 
 54. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006). 
 55. In re Merck & Co., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17. 
 56. Id. at 418. 
 57. Id. (citing In re NAHC, 306 F.3d 1314, 1326 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 58. Id. (citations omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 410. 
 61. Id. at 410-11. 
 62. Id. at 411. 
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2000 and 2001, with no consensus regarding which drug was affecting the 
risk of heart attacks.63 
“On September 17, 2001, the FDA issued a Warning Letter to Merck,” 
indicating that Merck had been misrepresenting VIOXX’s safety by 
discounting the results of the VIGOR study and ordering Merck to stop its 
misleading promotional campaign and correct the information it had 
distributed.64  This letter was widely discussed by the media throughout the 
following week and also spurred several new lawsuits, including two 
alleging consumer fraud.65  Despite these lawsuits, Merck kept VIOXX on 
the market until September 30, 2004; the voluntary withdrawal decision 
followed from early results of another VIOXX study Merck was performing 
that demonstrated an increased rate of heart attacks in the patients taking 
VIOXX as compared to those who were taking a placebo.66 
The district court determined that the plaintiffs had been on inquiry 
notice as early as October 2001, such that their claims were time-barred 
once filed in November 2003.67 The court reasoned that the results from the 
VIGOR study, combined with the FDA’s warning letter and the 
surrounding media coverage, showed that a reasonable investor would have 
recognized such signs as warnings of fraud.68  Furthermore, the court 
characterized the FDA warning letter as a direct accusation of fraud which 
was sufficient, in light of the circumstances, to start the clock on the two-
year statute of limitations.69 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, 
holding that the district court’s characterizations of the FDA warning letter 
and other alleged warnings were insufficient to put investors on inquiry 
notice of securities fraud.70  Since the FDA’s standards for a 
misrepresentation differ from those for securities fraud, they added nothing 
to what had already been stated in the VIGOR study and had no significant 
effect on the market price for Merck’s securities; therefore, the letter was 
not a sufficient accusation of fraud to put investors on inquiry notice.71  
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 411-13. 
 64. Id. at 413-14. 
 65. Id. at 414-15. 
 66. Id. at 416. 
 67. Id. at 424-25. 
 68. Id. at 419-21. 
 69. Id. at 421-22. 
 70. In re Merck & Co., Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litigation, 543 F.3d 150, 172 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 71. Id. at 169-71. 
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide when the 
statute of limitations for private securities fraud accrues.72 
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide two issues:  (1) 
when a private securities fraud cause of action accrues and (2) whether 
scienter is one of the “facts constituting the violation” that must be 
discovered prior to accrual.73  The Court affirmed the Second Circuit, 
holding that accrual occurs when the plaintiff either actually discovers or, 
with reasonable diligence, would have discovered the facts showing the 
fraud, including scienter.74 
1. The Meaning of “Discovery” 
As a prelude to its analysis, the Court first decided that the term 
“discovery” in the statute of limitations referred not only to facts that were 
actually known but also to those facts that “a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
would have known.”75  Although the Court agreed with the parties that 
discovery includes constructive discovery, the Court felt that explaining 
why this is so was important for its analysis of when the limitations period 
accrues.76 
According to the Court, in the context of statutes of limitations, 
“discovery” is usually a reference to the “discovery rule,” which delayed 
accrual for fraud cases until the plaintiff had a complete case, so long as the 
plaintiff was not at fault or lacking in diligence as to the discovery of the 
fraud claim.77  Over time, legislatures codified this rule and, in the process 
of interpreting those statutes, courts usually held that “discovery” refers to 
both actual and constructive discovery.78  The Court also noted that all the 
courts of appeals which have interpreted the meaning of the phrase “facts 
constituting the violation,” both under the original Lampf standard and the 
identical language added by Congress in the SOA, have interpreted the 
phrase to include the facts actually known and those that should have been 
discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.79  The Court found this 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Merck & Co., Inc., v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1784 (2010). 
 73. Id. at 1789-90. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1796. 
 76. Id. at 1793. 
 77. Id. at 1793-94. 
 78. Id. at 1794. 
 79. Id. at 1795. 
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history to be relevant because Congress is assumed to be aware of and to 
take into account relevant judicial precedent when enacting new laws.80 
2. Scienter as one of the “Facts Constituting the Violation” 
The Court then held that scienter is one of the “facts constituting the 
violation” that must be present before the statute of limitations accrues.81  
Scienter, defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud,” is a fact that makes up an essential part of a § 
10(b) claim.82  Since the applicable heightened pleading standards for such 
a claim require facts, claims that did not demonstrate scienter would simply 
be dismissed.  If the defendants could hide the facts related to scienter 
throughout the limitations period, a claim could be time-barred before it 
could even get to court, thus enabling defendants to perpetrate the very 
fraud the “discovery” rule in the statute of limitations seeks to prevent.83  
This issue proved to be dispositive in Merck, as the Court found no 
indications of scienter in the FDA warning letter or the products-liability 
complaints, thus leading to the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ case was 
timely filed.84 
3. Inquiry Notice  
Lastly, the Court rejected Merck’s propositions regarding the use of 
inquiry notice for accrual purposes.85  Since the statute states that accrual 
occurs only after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, inquiry 
notice cannot be the proper standard because inquiry notice initiates the 
limitations period once the plaintiff merely has reason to start 
investigating.86  The Court therefore rejected Merck’s argument that inquiry 
notice should still be the point of accrual when the actual plaintiff fails to 
undertake a reasonable investigation after being placed on inquiry notice.87  
The Court did add, however, that rejecting the inquiry notice standard 
would treat all plaintiffs equally, both those who are diligent and those who 
are not, because a plaintiff who entirely failed to investigate might not have 
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found sufficient facts to file a complaint that would satisfy the heightened 
pleading standards.88   
IV. Analysis 
In Merck, the Supreme Court’s reasoning did not properly take into 
account the purpose of the SOA and the ambiguity in 28 U.S.C. § 
1658(b)(1).  The Court rejected the circuit courts’ inquiry notice 
jurisprudence without giving full consideration to the comparative practical 
implications of the various formulations for when “discovery” occurs and 
the competing policy considerations embedded in the securities laws.  By 
considering the issues raised by policy and practicality, the Court would 
have recognized that the “duty to inquire” standard is a better standard, thus 
giving lower courts a clearer understanding of how to construe securities 
fraud statutes. 
A. Inquiry Notice Is Not Inconsistent with Accrual after Discovery of the 
Facts Constituting the Violation 
The Court’s unprovoked exposition of the meaning of the term 
“discovery” in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) precluded the court from being able 
to read the inquiry notice standard into that statute of limitations.  However, 
“discovery” could be read to refer to the “discovery rule,” which requires 
reasonable diligence on the part of the actual plaintiff.  Furthermore, 
Congress was aware of other relevant judicial precedent when it enacted the 
statute of limitations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; construing the statute in 
light of that awareness shows Congress likely did not mean to foreclose the 
“inquiry notice” standards.  Finally, the Court’s concern with the practical 
implications of an earlier accrual point had already been addressed by 
Congress when it doubled the time allowed in the limitations period. 
1. The Court Failed to Consider Fully the Meaning of “Discovery” 
The Court did not fully consider the standard of inquiry notice when it 
initially analyzed the meaning of discovery.  In the course of determining 
that the term “discovery” must include constructive discovery as well as 
actual discovery, the Court in Merck focused on a single interpretation of 
“discovery” to decide that the term included facts that “a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have known.”89  However, inquiry notice was never 
intended to be a substitution for the term discovery; instead, courts used 
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inquiry notice standards to determine when discovery occurred.  As support 
for its definition of discovery, the Court stated that all the courts of appeals 
had held that discovery includes, in addition to actual discovery, facts that a 
“hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered . . . .”90  
However, this summation ignores a critical aspect of the circuits’ standard:  
the exercise of reasonable diligence.91 
The term “discovery”, as used in the context of statutes of limitations, 
does tend to refer to the “discovery rule”,92 but the “discovery rule” can 
also imply a duty to exercise reasonable diligence.  Knowledge of sufficient 
facts to constitute storm warnings can create a duty to inquire.  A total 
failure to conduct an inquiry, at least in some jurisdictions, can result in an 
imputation of knowledge of the fraud.93  Therefore, “discovery” could also 
mean that due diligence is required, an interpretation which would not be 
inconsistent with the statutory language. 
Furthermore, the very purpose of the two-year statute of limitations 
period is to give the plaintiff time to develop and substantiate the facts of 
the case to the point that a lawsuit can be filed.  In Merck, the Court also 
suggests that the phrase “facts constituting the violation” includes the facts 
that make up the necessary elements of the claim.94  Were that the case, 
then the statutory period would not begin to run until the plaintiff had the 
facts needed to sue.  However, in enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Congress expressed clear concerns regarding the one-year statute of 
limitations provision for securities frauds in 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).95  Before 
the statutory period was extended in the SOA, courts had, in part, based 
their decisions to delay accrual on the fact that an earlier accrual point 
would often prevent plaintiffs from being able to substantiate their claims 
adequately.96  Likewise, one of Congress’ goals for the SOA was to deter 
securities frauds by ensuring plaintiffs had time to develop the facts of their 
cases.97  If plaintiffs could not develop their cases enough to sue within one 
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year or if defendants were able to conceal the fraud for three years, then 
securities frauds would not be effectively deterred by private lawsuits.  
Congress addressed this problem by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to provide 
for a two-year/five-year statute of limitations scheme for securities frauds, 
as compared to the former one-year/three-year scheme.98  Because the 
congressional purpose behind the lengthening of the statute of limitations 
period was to give plaintiffs more time to develop the facts, the Court 
should not have rejected a duty to inquire based on the potential lack of 
sufficient facts needed to satisfy heightened pleading requirements for 
securities frauds. 
2. Congress Implicitly Approved the Circuits’ Usage of Inquiry Notice 
When Congress enacted the SOA, it was presumptively aware of how the 
circuit courts were treating the very words it chose to use in the statute of 
limitations for private securities frauds.  As the Court explained, Congress 
can be assumed to be aware of relevant judicial precedent whenever it 
designs its statutes.99  Because both the “inquiry plus reasonable diligence” 
and “duty to inquire” standards existed prior to the enactment of the SOA 
and provided competing interpretations of the language in the limitations 
statute, they are certainly “relevant judicial precedent.”  Consequently, one 
can assume that Congress was aware of the use of the “inquiry plus 
reasonable diligence” and “duty to inquire” standards when it amended 28 
U.S.C. § 1658. 
Because Congress was aware of these precedents, Congress’ choice to 
adopt the exact same language previously used for the statute of limitations 
for private securities frauds demonstrates that Congress most likely did not 
have a contrary understanding of the meaning of the language.  Since 
Congress decided to retain the same language as that found in 15 U.S.C. § 
78i(e) when it could have opted to be more explicit, it demonstrated 
approval for that language by not attempting to correct the courts’ 
interpretations.100  Even if Congress did not actually approve the 
interpretations, Congress’ failure to clarify the meaning of “discovery” 
indicates that it is unlikely that Congress had an overarching sense of what 
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“discovery” should include and was willing to allow courts to decide the 
issue on their own.  Therefore, the “duty to inquire” standard is not 
inconsistent with the language in the limitations statute.   
B. An Alternative to the Merck Analysis—Which Standard Is Better? 
Because the imputation of knowledge of fraud due to failure to inquire is 
not inconsistent with the phrase “after discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation,”101 the Court should have more broadly considered the 
implications of its holding regarding the applicability of inquiry notice.  
Specifically, the Court should have considered whether the inquiry notice 
standard used by the Second and Third Circuits was more or less 
practicable than the Court’s standard and chosen the standard that better 
aligns with policy concerns. 
1. The Merck Standard Is Less Practicable than the Inquiry Notice 
Standard  
Under the Merck standard, investors have a decreased incentive to 
investigate fraud, which will inhibit courts from being able to determine 
accurately what facts were available to the plaintiffs at what time.  If the 
particular plaintiff fails to investigate when a reasonably diligent person 
would do so, the court will not know exactly what information an 
investigation could have uncovered.  For example, an investor who suspects 
fraud could contact a company during the course of an investigation, 
potentially revealing more of the facts constituting the violation.  But if no 
investigation is made at all, courts will not have a complete picture as to 
when particular information could have been made available and thus when 
the cause of action should be deemed to have accrued. 
The Court’s standard in Merck will allow investors who do not 
investigate to sue, which will lead to a decrease in the incentive to 
investigate, since investors can obtain a “free ride” into court.  Investors 
who fail to investigate indications of securities fraud can still join in 
lawsuits with those who have been diligent, allowing them a potential 
benefit from the lawsuit without expending any effort for an investigation.  
More investors will decide to allow other investors to keep watch for fraud.  
Given the inherently high level of complexity involved with recognizing 
and detecting securities frauds, less investigation by investors will likely 
result in fewer frauds being discovered; as a result, private securities fraud 
actions like §10(b) will lose their deterrence value, since issuers will 
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recognize when it becomes easier to get away with fraud and thus more 
investors will end up being defrauded.102  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should have included a duty to investigate, allowing for imputation of 
knowledge of the fraud if the plaintiff failed to conduct any investigation 
after being put on inquiry notice. 
2. The Merck Standard Is Less Consistent with the Policies Underlying 
the Securities Laws 
The standard announced in Merck is most consistent with the policy of 
ensuring that investors have sufficient time to sue.  By delaying accrual 
until investors would actually be able to discover the basis of their claims, 
the Supreme Court decided not to fault investors for failing to investigate 
when the investigation might not have revealed sufficient information to 
plead securities fraud.103  However, as previously discussed, the SOA 
already accounted for the need for giving investors extra time to develop 
their claims by extending the limitations period.104  Furthermore, since the 
Court held that scienter is one of the “facts constituting the violation” which 
must be present before discovery can occur, the duty to investigate would 
not be triggered until “storm warnings” exist indicating scienter. 
Another important policy to consider is that of preventing opportunism 
by defrauded investors.  Opportunism is particularly problematic in 
securities fraud cases because there are two methods by which investors can 
potentially benefit from delaying their lawsuits.  First, investors could delay 
in order to avoid the expenses and effort of suing when recovery is 
uncertain until another party has taken the risk and won.  Second, investors 
could wait and see if the price of the stock that is the subject of the alleged 
fraud increases.105  This ends up benefiting investors either way, allowing 
investors to hold off a lawsuit to benefit from capital gains if stock 
performance improves or sue for fraud if the stock price decreases.106  
Requiring investors to investigate potential fraud or risk losing their right to 
sue due to the statute of limitations will help reduce the risk of opportunism 
because investors will be forced to make their choice earlier between suing 
for fraud or retaining their stock. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F.3d 956, 968 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 103. See Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1798. 
 104. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 105. See Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 106. See id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012




Analysis of the relevant policy concerns as well as a comparison of the 
practicality of the Court’s standard and the previous inquiry notice standard 
show that the Supreme Court should not have done away with the “duty to 
inquire” standard for securities fraud accrual determinations.  Contrary to 
the Court’s holding, an inquiry notice standard can be read into the 
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1658 because the term “discovery” had developed 
through securities fraud case law to refer to inquiry notice and because 
“discovery” can be read to include a duty to inquire similar to that required 
by the discovery rule.  A comparison of the impacts of the Court’s standard 
to those of the “duty to inquire” standard shows that imputing knowledge 
due to a failure to investigate is more practical than the Court’s standard.  
Furthermore, the Court’s standard is less closely aligned with relevant 
policies related to securities laws and will be less effective than the “duty to 
inquire” standard at encouraging investigation. 
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